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Abstract
We elucidate a close connection between the Theory of Judgment Aggregation (more generally,
Evaluation Aggregation), and a relatively young but rapidly growing field of universal algebra, that
was primarily developed to investigate constraint satisfaction problems. Our connection yields a full
classification of non-binary evaluations into possibility and impossibility domains both under the
idempotent and the supportive conditions. Prior to the current result E. Dokow and R. Holzman
nearly classified non-binary evaluations in the supportive case, by combinatorial means. The alge-
braic approach gives us new insights to the easier binary case as well, which had been fully classified
by the above authors. Our algebraic view lets us put forth a suggestion about a strengthening of
the Non-dictatorship criterion, that helps us avoid “outliers” like the affine subspace. Finally, we
give upper bounds on the complexity of computing if a domain is impossible or not (to our best
knowledge no finite time bounds were given earlier).
Keywords: Judgment aggregation, Discursive dilemma, Condorcet’s paradox, Arrow’s impossibility
theorem, Social choice theory, Dictatorship, Compatible operations, Constraint satisfaction problems,
Dichotomy, Polymorphisms
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1 Introduction
The goal of Judgment Aggregation is to investigate the existence or nonexistence of functions that “ag-
gregate individual sets of judgments on multiple, logically connected propositions into collective sets
of judgments” [LP02]. Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which can be interpreted in the judgment ag-
gregation framework, is a powerful example showing that even in simple cases we cannot meaningfully
aggregate individual opinions into a social opinion.
Elad Dokow and Ron Holzman [DH10a, DH10b] have studied an elegant generalization of Judgment
Aggregation, that we call after their title Aggregation of Evaluations. Let J be a finite set of issues
and D be a finite set of possible positions/opinions (like ‘yes’, ‘no’ etc.). Without loss of generality
we assume that
J = [m] = {1, . . . ,m}.
An evaluation (v1, . . . , vm) ∈ Dm assigns a position in D to each j ∈ [m]. The binary case, when
D = {0, 1} has received special attention [Wil75, RF86, DH10a]. Our fundamental object is the
domain X ⊆ Dm of feasible evaluations, these are the evaluations (i.e. opinion-combinations) that we
allow for the voters to choose from.
Example 1. Assume that during a murder trial the members of the jury have to vote on two issues:
1. the suspect had a knife; 2. the suspect was the murderer; with taking a position either ‘yes’ or ‘no’
on each of the issues. Each member must take a position on both issues, but the jury agrees that the
position-combination (1: no, 2: yes) should not be valid: neither as an individual vote nor when we
aggregate the votes. Thus X = {(no,no), (yes,no), (yes,yes)}.
Aggregators. When n members of a society take a position on all of the m issues, and each member’s
vote is from X, we get a profile vector
(x(1), . . . , x(n)) ∈ Xn.
Our goal is to design a function f : Xn → X that takes profile vectors into single elements of X.
Such functions are called aggregators. The aggregators we shall consider must satisfy three conditions
that come directly from Arrow’s famous conditions, he has identified while studying the special case
of preference list aggregation. Before we describe them we remark that
x(i) = (x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
m ) ∈ Dm for i = 1, · · · , n,
are vectors themselves: x
(i)
j is the i
th voter position on the jth issue. Thus the profile is a vector of
vectors. The output of f is a vector in Dm, representing the aggregated positions on the m issues.
The latter vector must also belong to X.
The first and key condition is that each issue ought to be aggregated independently from the others
(also called point-wise aggregation or Issue by Issue Aggregation):
Issue-by-Issue Aggregation (IIA): There are functions fj : D
n → D (1 ≤ j ≤ m) such that for
every (x(1), . . . , x(n)) ∈ Xn:
f(x(1), . . . , x(n)) =
(
f1
(
x
(1)
1 , . . . , x
(n)
1
)
, . . . , fm
(
x(1)m , . . . , x
(n)
m
))
There is a nice way to visualize the IIA property via the picture
x
(1)
1 · · · x(1)m ∈ X
...
x
(n)
1 · · · x(n)m ∈ X
↓f1 · · · ↓fm
x1 · · · xm ∈ X
Above we aggregate column j (where j ∈ [m] is an issue) by function fj . The condition that f takes
Xn to X is equivalent to saying that if each row belongs to X, then so does the aggregated row. The
component aggregate functions should work in unison to accomplish this. We have adopted the term
“Issue by Issue Aggregation” coined by E. Dokow and R. Holzman [DH10a, DH10b], which is in this
generalized context more fitting than the commonly used “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”
expression, with the benefit that the acronym remains the same.
Uniqueness of the IIA decomposition. The representation of f : Xn → X as (f1, . . . , fm) is
clearly not unique for instance when D contains any element that does not occur as a constituent in
any x ∈ X. In order to avoid non-uniqueness of the fjs we define
Dj = prjX = {uj | (u1, . . . , um) ∈ X}.
If we define fj on D
n
j instead of D
n, it is easy to see that fj becomes unique. Throughout the paper
we shall assume this.
Next we describe the two other conditions (besides IIA) Arrow has imposed on an aggregator f :
Xn → X.
Idempotency (or Unanimity): f(x, . . . , x) = x for every x ∈ X.
Lemma 1. An IIA aggregator f = (f1, . . . , fm) is idempotent if and only if every fj is idempotent in
the universal algebraic sense, i.e.
∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m ∀ u ∈ Dj : fj(u, . . . , u) = u
Non-dictatorship: Aggregator f : Xn → X is a dictatorship if there is a 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that for
every (x(1), . . . , x(n)) ∈ Xn we have f(x(1), . . . , x(n)) = x(k). Otherwise the Non-dictatorship
condition holds for f .
Lemma 2. An IIA aggregator f = (f1, . . . , fm) is a dictatorship if and only if there is a 1 ≤ k ≤ m
such that each fj is a projection on the k
th coordinate in the universal algebraic sense:
∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m ∀ u1, . . . , un ∈ Dj : fj(u1, . . . , un) = uk
Definition 1 (Impossibility/Possibility domains). We call an X ⊆ Dm a possibility domain
(after Arrow) with respect to the IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship conditions if for some n ≥ 2
an aggregator function f for X with arity n exists that satisfies the three said conditions. Otherwise
X is an impossibility domain.
In this article we completely characterize impossibility domains with respect to the IIA + Idempotency
+ Non-dictatorship and also for the case when Idempotency is replaced with
Supportiveness: f : Xn → X is supportive if for every x(1), . . . , x(n) ∈ Xn and every 1 ≤ j ≤ m we
have that f(x(1), . . . , x(n))j ∈ {x(1)j , . . . , x(n)j }.
Lemma 3. An IIA aggregator f = (f1, . . . , fm) is a supportive if and only if every fj is conservative
in the universal algebraic sense:
∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m ∀ u1, . . . , un ∈ Dj : fj(u1, . . . , un) ∈ {u1, . . . , un}
Supportiveness implies Idempotency, but not vice versa.
Prior to our result a full characterization of all impossible binary domains was obtained under IIA
+ Idempotency + Non-dictatorship in [DH10a]. They have extended their work to the non-binary
case, but have obtained only a partial characterization, and only under the IIA + Supportiveness +
Non-dictatorship conditions.
In our characterization we exploit a Galois Connection discovered by D. Geiger [Gei68]. Geiger’s
duality theorem allows us to characterize the nonexistence of aggregators with existence of gadgets —
existential logical expressions created from X and a few very basic relations, like assignment giving or
unary relations. (Gadgets are also sometimes called conjunctive queries in the literature.) Our main
results are stated in Theorem 8 and Theorem 17. Our main contribution is not any new technology
but rather pointing to a so far unexplored very broad connection. Simplicity only works to the new
connection’s favor.
Based on the algebraic view, we are also in the position to strengthen the Non-dictatorship condition
to exclude the possibility of what experts agree are outliers such as linear subspaces.
The theory we use here is getting increasingly familiar to computer scientists because it gives a powerful
machinery to tackle the well-known dichotomy conjecture of Feder and Vardy [FV98] for Constraint
Satisfaction Problems (CSP). The hope is that the connection will allow researchers to exploit the
vast material that CSP research has created, in proving impossibility theorems.
2 Background
The elegant general combinatorial framework described in the introduction which serves as the basis
of the current paper was laid down by E. Dokow and and R. Holzman in [DH10a, DH10b]. We
have named it “Aggregation of Evaluations” after their titles. In their two breakthrough results they
make decisive advances towards classifying impossibility domains, i.e. those X from which we cannot
aggregate opinions. In particular, they completely settle the binary case. To explain their results we
need some definitions.
Definition 2. We call X non-degenerate if |prjX| > 1 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Since the issues where
degeneration occurs can be trivially aggregated, without loss of generality we can assume that X is
non-degenerate.
Definition 3 (Blockedness graph and MIPE). The blockedness graph for domain X ⊆ {0, 1}m is the
following directed graph on the vertex set V = [m]× {0, 1}: There is a directed edge from (k, σ) ∈ V
to (`, ρ) ∈ V where k 6= ` if and only if there are: (i.) a subset S ⊆ [m] such that k, ` ∈ S and (ii.)
a (partial-)evaluation u : S → {0, 1} with uk = σ and u` = ¬ρ such that there is no extension of u
to any full evaluation x in X, but if we flip any bit of u then the resulting partial evaluation extends
to some element of X. The above partial assignment u is called a MIPE (minimally infeasible partial
evaluation).
Definition 4 (Total blockedness). Domain X ⊆ {0, 1}m has the total blockedness condition if and
only if the blockedness graph is strongly connected.
A result leading to [DH10a] was that of Nehring and Puppe [NP02]. They have obtained a complete
classification of binary impossibility domains, when a monotonicity condition is added to the usual
conditions. An aggregator is said to be monotone if for every issue j in any situation the aggregate
position on issue j does not change if a voter decides to switch his/her position on the jth issue to the
current aggregate position.
Theorem 4 (Nehring and Puppe [NP02]). A non-degenerate X ⊆ {0, 1}m is an impossibility domain
with respect to IIA + Idempotency + Monotonicity + Non-dictatorship if and only if X is totally
blocked.
The complete characterization of binary evaluations without the monotonicity condition was finally
given by E. Dokow and R. Holzman:
Theorem 5 (E. Dokow, R. Holzman [DH10a]). Let X ⊆ {0, 1}m, non degenerate. Then X is an
impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship if and only if X is totally
blocked and is not an affine subspace.
Dokow and Holzman has also made significant progress for general D [DH10b]. In their near-
characterization they use a generalization of total blockedness for non-binary predicates, which is
similar but more intricate than the binary notion, and we postpone the definition to Section 10.1
(Definition 17).
We also need to define a condition on a relation X, which is called 2-decomposability in the universal
algebra literature. We have adopted this term rather than the “not multiply constrained” expression
for the same concept in [DH10b].
Definition 5. For an m-ary relation X on D and for 1 ≤ k < ` ≤ m, let prk,`X = {(uk, u`) |
(u1, . . . , um) ∈ X}. A relation X is called 2-decomposable if, for any tuple x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Dm we
have x ∈ X if and only if (xk, x`) ∈ prk,`X for all 1 ≤ k < ` ≤ m.
Remark 1. Coincidentally, in [DH10b] the ‘2-decomposable’ expression also occurs, but with a very
different meaning.
Theorem 6 (E. Dokow, R. Holzman [DH10b]). Let X ⊆ Dm, non-degenerate and non-binary (there
is a 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that |prjX| > 2). If X is totally blocked and not 2-decomposable (see Definition
5) then X is an impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship.
Theorem 7 (E. Dokow, R. Holzman [DH10b]). Let X ⊆ Dm. If X is non-degenerate and not totally
blocked then X is a possibility domain with respect to IIA + Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship.
3 Our Results
In spite of the impressive advances due to Dokow and Holzman, important questions have remained
open: 1. Complete the characterization of the Supportive case, when |D| > 3. (In [DH10b] the case
|D| = 3 is resolved.) 2. Settle the |D| > 2 case with the Idempotency condition.
We take the inspiration from the algebraic theory and combine it with ideas from [DH10b] to get a
full characterization of the non-binary case, with the Supportiveness and the Idempotency conditions.
Theorem 8. Let X ⊆ Dm, non-degenerate and non-binary. If X is totally blocked then X is an
impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Supportiveness (Idempotent) + Non-dictatorship if and
only if there is no Supportive (Idempotent) non-dictatorial IIA aggregator with at most three (|D|)
voters.
The characterization (to our knowledge for the first time) allows for an algorithmic determination if
X is an impossibility domain with respect to the Supportive (Idempotent) conditions.
Gadgets. It turns out that we can characterize impossibility domains in a dual way, in terms of
a set of gadgets. Our new characterization, that provides witnesses to impossibility, has not been
known earlier in the voting theory context. Gadgets (or conjunctive queries) are expressions used
in reductions between constraint satisfaction problems when we translate instances locally (term by
term). They are existentially quantified conjuncts of clauses, where each clause is a relation. The
relations in this interpretation are viewed as Boolean-valued functions on not necessarily Boolean
variables. The syntax of a gadget is:
R(~x) = ∃~y : S1(~x, ~y) ∧ . . . ∧ Sk(~x, ~y) (each Si in effect depends only on subsets of ~x, ~y)
Their purpose is to express new relations from a given set of relations.
A theorem of D. Geiger [Gei68] establishes a connection between the nonexistence of aggregators for
a set Γ of relations and the existence of Γ-gadgets (i.e. in which all relations are from Γ or the
’=’ relation). This theorem serves as the backbone of the algebraic theory of constraint satisfaction
problems developed by P. Jeavons, A. A. Bulatov, A. A. Krokhin, D. A. Cohen, M. Cooper, M. Gyssens
[JCG97, Jea98, JCC98, BJK05] and several other researchers.
Figure 1: The multi-sorted Not All Equal (NAE) gadget to express the multi-sorted inequality relation
between x1 (type 1) and x2 (type 3). Variables y1 and y2 are existentially bound (and they are also
set to constant). This gadget is central in our proof of Arrow’s theorem.
This is our starting point too. In universal algebra (IIA) aggregators are called polymorphisms. They
differ from the aggregators in our introduction in that they are single-sorted: f1 = f2 = . . . = fm.
Multi-sorted polymorphisms, i.e. when the fjs can be different, have also been studied in the algebraic
literature [BJ03, Bul11]. When dealing with multi-sorted polymorphisms, all relations and gadgets
must be multi-sorted as well. In the multi-sorted world first we must declare a type for every variable.
The typing of the variables serves the same purpose as in programming languages: when a function
is called, the types of the called variables must match with the types in the function declaration. In
the same spirit, every multi-sorted l-ary relation R we construct (or given to us) must come with a
sequence of l (not necessarily different) types. We may call this type declaration. The typing must
be consistent: the the types of the variables involved in any occurrence of a relation in a gadget must
match with the type declaration.
In this article we prove a multi-sorted version of Geiger’s theorem (see Section 4). This allows us to
prove impossibility results simply by producing sets of gadgets. If we want to prove that X ⊆∏mj Dj
is an impossibility domain, we need to construct X+-gadgets for a certain “complete” set of (multi-
sorted) relations. Here the ‘+’ in the upper index refers to the permission to use assignment-giving
relations (i.e. ‘x = a,’ where a ∈ Dj , for type j variables) in our gadgets in addition to X. In all cases
X must be viewed as a multi-sorted relation, all components (arguments) having different types. The
Idempotency constraint is encoded in the ‘+’ of X+. Alternatively, the Supportiveness condition in
the gadget-reformulation translates to the permission of using arbitrary unary relations in the gadgets.
When we allow the latter, the gadget is an Xf-gadget.
Theorem 9. For every D and m there is a fixed finite set P = P(D,m) of multi-sorted relations
such that X ⊆ Dm is an impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Idempotency (Supportiveness) +
Non-dictatorship if and only if we can express every member of P with a gadget whose conjunct has
only (appropriately multi-sorted) X+- ( Xf)-clauses. In addition, the number of auxiliary variables
is upper bounded by some explicit function φ(m, |D|) (single exponential in m).
The theorem in more details is restated in Theorem 17 and proved in section 6.
Our characterizations allow us to compute in finite time if X is an impossibility domain (both in the
Idempotent and in Supportive cases) in two different ways: either by checking aggregators up to a
certain number of arguments (Theorem 8), or by checking gadgets up to a certain size (Theorem 9).
One of the main applications of our gadget characterization is that we can prove the impossibility
of a domain X by merely presenting a few gadgets (rather than trying to exclude a large set of
aggregators). In some cases we can tailor the gadgets to the specific problem, exploiting symmetries.
A combined approach where we exclude most aggregators by gadgets while the rest we treat directly
is also possible. Using gadgets we can show that the Pairwise Distinctness relation defined by
{(u1, . . . , um) ∈ Dm | uk 6= u` (1 ≤ k < ` ≤ m)}
is an impossibility domain when |D| > m ≥ 2 and when |D| = m ≥ 3 with respect to the IIA
+ Idempotency + Non-dictatorship conditions. In [DH10b] this is proven only under the IIA +
Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship conditions, and [FF11] proves the above only when |D| = m > 2.
The possibility notion we have discussed is considered too generous by some authors. Several further
restrictions were studied e.g. [Kal02]. Dokow and Holzman, for instance, question if linear subspaces
of {0, 1}m that emerge in Theorem 5 should really be considered possibility domains [DH10a]. In
Section 12 we propose a new aggregator class that strengthens the notion of Non-dictatorship. Our
new definition directly comes from the algebraic theory and has many desirable properties.
Although the case of binary evaluations was completely settled by Dokow and Holzman, universal
algebra gives a tad more refined form of their theorem:
Theorem 10. Let X ⊆ {0, 1}m non-degenerate. Then X is an impossibility domain with respect
to IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship if and only if X is totally blocked and it is not an affine
subspace. If X is not totally blocked then for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m one of the following holds:
1. there is an f such that fj is the semi-lattice operation u ∨ v or u ∧ v,
2. there is an f such that fj is the majority operation (u ∨ v) ∧ (v ∨ w) ∧ (w ∨ u),
3. there is an f such that fj is the Mal’tsev operation u− v + w mod 2,
4. fj is a dictatorship for every f .
4 The algebraic theory
A key observation is that the algebraic theory can be made work in the assignment aggregation
context if we turn to multi-sorted relations, gadgets, polymorphisms, etc. instead of the more usual
single-sorted ones.
Multi-sorted relations differ from usual relations in that each component of the relation we consider
has a type. Each type b has a designated range set Db. Without loss of generality we may assume that
the set of permissible types is [t] = {1, . . . , t} where t is a fixed positive integer. The corresponding
ranges are D1, . . . , Dt. Let X ⊆
∏m
j=1Dτj where τj ∈ [t] for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. We denote X with (X, τ),
where τ = (τ1, . . . , τm), to indicate both that it is multi-sorted and the types of its components. (In
our assignment aggregation setting t = m, Dj = prjX and the typing of X will be (X, (1, . . . ,m)).)
Definition 6 (gadgets, multi-sorted). We fix a type set [t], {Db}b∈[t]. A multi-sorted relation (R, τ)
multi-sorted gadget-reduces to a set Γ of multi-sorted relations if there is a multi-sorted gadget ex-
pression
R(x1, . . . , xk) = ∃ y1, . . . , yk′ : R1(z1,1, . . . , z1,k1) ∧ . . . ∧Rp(zp,1, . . . , zp,kp)
where each Ri is either from Γ or the multi-sorted equality relation (x = y, (b,b)) (so type(x) =
type(y) = b) for some b ∈ [t]. Variables z1,1, . . . , zp,kp are from the set {x1, . . . , xk} ∪ {y1, . . . , yk′}.
In the algebraic theory of CSPs voting functions are called polymorphisms. They are very extensively
studied and classified according to their algebraic properties. In the more usual single-sorted case we
are forced to aggregate each issue with the same function. In the multi-sorted case different types are
aggregated independently: we have as many aggregator functions as types. (Even when for two types
a 6= b we have Da = Db, aggregators fa and fb may differ.) These are exactly the polymorphisms we
need in the evaluation aggregation setting.
Definition 7 (multi-sorted polymorphism). Fix t, {Db}b∈[t]. Let (X, τ) be a multi-sorted relation
where τ = (τ1, . . . , τm) ∈ [t]m. Fix n ≥ 1. A collection fb : Dnb → Db (1 ≤ b ≤ t) of functions is said to
be a multi-sorted polymorphism of (X, τ) if the tuple (fτ1 , . . . , fτm) is an IIA aggregator for relation
X, i.e. it takes Xn into X. More generally, a collection fb : D
n
b → Db (1 ≤ b ≤ t) of functions is a
multi-sorted polymorphism with respect to a set Γ of multi-sorted relations (each relation is over the
same fixed set of types) if {fb}b∈[t] is a multi-sorted polymorphism for each relation in Γ.
Note. The above generalizes the notion of single sorted polymorphism, when t = 1 and D1 = D, and
also the IIA aggregators of the introduction with the choice t = m, Dj = Prj(X), and with typing X
as (X, (1, . . . ,m)).
Definition 8 (MPol). Fix [t] and {Db}b∈[t]. The set of all multi-sorted polymorphisms for a set Γ of
multi-sorted relations is denoted by MPol(Γ).
Definition 9 (MInv). Fix [t] and {Db}b∈[t]. The set of all multi-sorted relations that are kept by a
set F of multi-sorted aggregator functions is denoted by MInv(F).
Definition 10 (〈·〉). Fix [t] and {Db}b∈[t]. For a set Γ of multi-sorted relations we define:
〈Γ〉 = {(R, τ) | (R, τ) multi-sorted gadget- reduces to Γ}
Now we can state our multi-sorted Geiger theorem:
Theorem 11. Fix [t] and {Db}b∈[t], and let Γ,Γ′ be (possibly infinite) sets of multi-sorted relations
and let F ,F ′ be (possibly infinite) sets of multi-sorted aggregators. Then
1. MInv(MPol(Γ)) = 〈Γ〉
2. Γ ⊆ Γ′ =⇒ MPol(Γ′) ⊆ MPol(Γ)
3. F ⊆ F ′ =⇒ MInv(F ′) ⊆ MInv(F)
Proof. Let us first recall the single-sorted Geiger theorem:
Theorem 12 (D. Geiger [Gei68]). Fix D, and let Γ,Γ′ be (possibly infinite) sets of relations on D
and let F ,F ′ be (possibly infinite) sets of functions, such that each function is from some D power to
D (i.e. aggregator functions for D). Then
1. Inv(Pol(Γ)) = 〈Γ〉
2. Pol(Inv(F)) = [F ]
3. Γ ⊆ Γ′ =⇒ Pol(Γ′) ⊆ Pol(Γ)
4. F ⊆ F ′ =⇒ Inv(F ′) ⊆ Inv(F)
In order to make the translation of our multi-sorted version to the above single-sorted one we first
define
D = D1∪˙D2∪˙ · · · ∪˙Dt
where Db is the range for type b. If originally the Dbs are not disjoint, we make them disjoint without
the loss of generality. A non-empty multi-sorted relation X ⊆ Dτ1 × · · ·×Dτm can be now interpreted
as the single-sorted relation XD ⊆ Dm. We remark that viewing them as sets, X and XD are exactly
the same. The index D in XD is only a reminder that we view XD as a single sorted relation over
domain D, while we view X as (X, τ). Since the Dbs are disjoint, from any such XD 6= ∅ we can
recover the types of every coordinate (the components of a single element of XD already give this
information). If Γ is a set of multi-sorted relations over a fixed type-set [t], let ΓD be the set of those
XDs that X ∈ Γ.
For b ∈ [t] we introduce the unary relation Tb on D (in the single sorted world):
Tb(u) ←→ u ∈ Db
In other words, Tb(u) expresses that “u has type b in the multi-sorted world.” For the set {T1, . . . , Tt}
of relations we introduce the notation Θ.
Definition 11. Let ∆ be any set of relations on D such that Θ ⊆ ∆. Then for any polymorphism
f : Dn → D of ∆ and any b ∈ [t] we can define fb : Dnb → Db as fb(x) = f(x) on Dnb .
Note. We know that f on Dnb takes value from Db since it is an aggregator of Tb ∈ ∆.
We have now:
Lemma 13. Let Γ be any set of multi-sorted relations over a fixed type-set [t] and with the notations
as before. Then the following are equivalent:
1. (f1, . . . , ft) is a multi-sorted polymorphism for Γ;
2. the sequence f1, . . . , ft arises, as in Definition 11, from some polymorphism f of ∆ = ΓD ∪Θ.
We do not prove this easy lemma. Returning to the proof of Theorem 11, the only challenge is to prove
1. since 2. and 3. are obvious. It is also follows from known composition lemmas (polymorphisms
compose, as do gadgets) that
MInv(MPol(Γ)) ⊇ 〈Γ〉
We have to show the containment in the other direction. Theorem 12 gives that
Inv(Pol(ΓD ∪Θ)) = 〈ΓD ∪Θ〉D
Here the subscript in 〈·〉D refers to that gadget generation is taken in the single sorted world. Our
proof scheme is to relate 〈Γ〉 to 〈ΓD ∪Θ〉D and MInv(MPol(Γ)) to Inv(Pol(ΓD ∪Θ)).
Which non-empty relations can we generate from ΓD ∪Θ, i.e. what are the elements of 〈ΓD ∪Θ〉? A
gadget with this set of generators is of the form
R(x1, . . . , xk) = ∃ y1, . . . , yk′ : R1(z1,1, . . . , z1,k1) ∧ . . . ∧Rp(zp,1, . . . , zp,kp) (1)
where each Ri is either from ΓD or from Θ or the = relation.
Definition 12. We say that (an x- or y-) variable z in (1) has type b if whenever the conjunct holds
for an assignment (without the existential quantifier), z has a value in Db. In different words, adding
Tb(z) to the conjunction would not eliminate any of the satisfying assignments of the conjunct.
Since a ΓD ∪ Θ gadget (recall, this is a single-sorted gadget) has variables only over D, there is no
a priori type restriction (other than the entire D) on any variable. Nevertheless, if a variable z is
involved in a relation SD, where S is a relation from Γ, then S gives a type b to that variable: SD
never holds if z 6∈ Db, so we might as well restrict z to Db. Assume now that there is a variable z′
such that the right hand side of (1) contains the relation z = z′ with an already restricted z. Then z′
must also be from Db. Of course, a chain of such equations also enforces a type on the variable in the
end of the chain. Finally, any relation Tb(z) enforces a type b on z. In summary, we can assign type b
to variable z if
1. Tb(z) occurs in the gadget;
2. z occurs in a constraint from ΓD with type b;
3. There is a chain of equality relations that starts form any variable restricted to type b (by 1. or
2.) that leads to z.
We note that a variable cannot have two different (i.e. contradicting) types defined this way. Any
contradiction in types would make R unsatisfiable (i.e. the empty relation). Therefore R is equivalent
to a direct product of a “typed part” and an “untyped part”:
R = Rtyped × (w1,1 = · · · = w1,s1)× · · · × (wl,1 = · · · = wl,sl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
untyped part
The wi,js are variables and the untyped (or typed) part might not be there. Point 1.-3. also give that
Rtyped is a syntactically recognizable part of R that arises by deleting some variables and terms from
the right hand side. Although Rtyped is a ΓD-gadget (recall that ΓD is an untyped set of relations
constructed from the typed set of relations, Γ), because of its syntax we can also read it as a (typed) Γ-
gadget, and in addition with the exact same semantics (meaning that Rtyped as a set is the exact same
set as when we read the formula as a Γ-gadget). So Rtyped [viewed as a multi-sorted relation] ∈ 〈Γ〉.
Next we claim that
R ∈ MInv(MPol(Γ)) −→ RD ∈ Inv(Pol(ΓD ∪Θ)).
The left hand side reads that R is kept by all multi-sorted polymorphism (f1, ..., ft) ∈ MPol(Γ)). By
Lemma 13 we have that f ∈ Pol(ΓD ∪ Θ) if and only if its component-sequence (as in Definition 11)
(f1, ..., ft) ∈ MPol(Γ). So RD is kept by all f ∈ Pol(ΓD ∪Θ), proving our claim.
By the single sorted Geiger theorem (applied to ΓD∪Θ) we have then that since RD ∈ Inv(Pol(ΓD∪Θ)),
we also have that RD ∈ 〈ΓD ∪ Θ〉. Two paragraphs earlier we have seen, that then RD must be of
the form Rtyped × (α1,1 = · · · = α1,s1)× · · · × (αl,1 = · · · = αl,sl). But since all component of RD are
typed, only the typed part is there (RD = Rtyped = R as sets). So R ∈ 〈Γ〉.
5 Gadgets characterize Impossibility
The Galois connection of Geiger (and its multi-sorted version) sends the message that the more gadgets
we can create from a set of relations (or from a single relation), the smaller set of aggregators this set
of relations has. An impossibility domain X does not have any non-trivial aggregator, therefore X is
expected to generate all relations. Of corse, what excites us more is the converse. If we can write all
relations as gadgets made from X and some simple relations then X must be an impossibility domain.
There is however some work ahead:
1. We need to understand the role of the Idempotency (Supportiveness) conditions.
2. We want to find a minimal (for algorithmic reasons, but also for convenience) gadget set that
already implies the impossibility of X.
5.1 The Idempotency and Supportiveness conditions
The Idempotency and Supportiveness conditions correspond to adding extra relations to our base
set of relations from which we build the gadgets that prove the impossibility of X. Our base set is
originally {X}. For the Idempotency condition we add all Assignment-giving relations and for the
Supportiveness condition we add all Unary relations (notions defined below).
Definition 13 (Unary relations, Xf). A multi-sorted unary relation is (x ∈ A, (a)), where a ∈ [t] is
a type and A ⊆ Da. For a multi-sorted relation X we define Xf as the set of relations that consists
of X and all unary relations for the type set [t], {Db}b∈[t] on which X is defined.
Definition 14 (Assignment-giving relations, X+). Multi-sorted assignment-giving relations are unary
relations of the form (x = v, (a)), where v ∈ Da (i.e. |A| = 1). X+ is the set of relations that includes
X and all assignment giving relations for the type set [t], {Db}b∈[t] on which X is defined.
Lemma 14. A multi-sorted function g = (g1, . . . , gt), where ga : D
n
a → Da, is idempotent, (meaning
each ga is idempotent) if and only if it aggregates all assignment giving relations for all types. It is
supportive, if and only if it aggregates all unary relations for all types.
We omit the simple proof of this known statement.
5.2 The Translation of the original problem
Before characterizing it with gadgets, we devote a short section to the exact notion of ‘impossibility’
in the algebraic language.
Lemma 15. The following voting theory and algebraic conditions are equivalent:
Algebra Voting Theory
X ⊆ Dm is a relation X ⊆ Dm is a Domain
f = (f1, . . . , fm), where fj : D
n
j → Dj. Here
Dj = prjX by definition (resticting D to Dj
is important).
IIA aggregator function f : Xn → X
∃ 1 ≤ k ≤ n : all fj are projections on their
kth coordinate.
f is a Dictatorship
All fjs are idempotent (supportive) f is idempotent (supportive)
The following voting theory and algebraic problems are equivalent:
Algebra Voting Theory
Determine if X has Determine if X has
idempotent (supportive) idempotent (supportive)
non-dictatorial non-dictatorial
multi-sorted polymorphism. IIA aggregator.
X is an impossibility domain if the answer to the above question is “No.”
5.3 Characterization of Impossibility Domains in terms of gadgets
Applying Lemmas 14, 15 and our multi-sorted Geiger’s theorem (Theorem 11) it is not hard to show:
Lemma 16. Domain X ⊆ Dm is impossible with respect to IIA + Idempotency (Supportiveness) +
Non-dictatorship if and only if all multi-sorted relations can be generated as multi-sorted X+ (Xf)
-gadgets. Here t = m, Dj = prjX for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and the typing of X is (X, (1, . . . ,m)).
The set of all (multi-sorted) relations is however infinitely large! Luckily, we can select a finite subset
(actually, in many different ways) that generate all relations, and it is sufficient to consider only those.
Definition 15 (The Non-Binary OR relation). We define the multi-sorted relation Ru,vk,` which is
unsatisfied only when x = u and y = v simultaneously hold (x has type k and v has type `). In
formula:
Ru,vk,` (x, y) = (¬(x = u ∧ y = v), (k, `)).
Definition 16 (The multi-sorted Not-All-Equal relation). The multi-sorted NAE relation on types
a, b, c is defined only when Da = Db = Dc = {0, 1}. In this case
NAEa,b,c(x, y, z) = (|{x, y, z}| > 1, (a, b, c)).
We are now ready to state our gadget-characterization of impossibility domains X:
Theorem 17. Let X ⊆ Dm non-degenerate. Let t = m and τ = (1, . . . ,m), and the range for type j be
Dj = prjX. Then X is an impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship
if and only if there are (X, τ)+-gadgets expressing Ru,vk,` for every 1 ≤ k, ` ≤ m; u ∈ prkX, v ∈ pr`X.
Furthermore, if |Dj | = 2 for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we also need to add the multi-sorted NAE gadget
on types (j, j, j). The analogous statement, when we replace “Idempotency” with “Supportiveness”
requires to replace (X, τ)+ with (X, τ)f.
6 Gadget-power
First we give a proof of Theorem 17. We show the non-trivial direction, i.e. that if we can create all
gadgets required by Theorem 17, the only polymorphisms that remain are dictatorships.
Remark 2. Even a single gadget present in 〈Γ〉 can have strong consequences. For instance, if
we can construct the equality gadget (x = y, (a, b)) between two different types a and b (with a
common alphabet), any multi-sorted polymorphism (f1, . . . , ft) ∈ MPol(Γ) must have the same a and
b components. We prove this in the end of the section.
Our way to prove Theorem 17 is to start to create gadgets and use them as “subroutines” to create
even more gadgets. The following lemma says that for any fixed 1 ≤ k, ` < t from Ru,vk,` ∈ 〈Γ〉 one can
construct all multi-sorted binary relation with type (k, `) in 〈Γ〉.
Lemma 18. Let 1 ≤ k, ` ≤ t and (S, (k, `)) be any multi-sorted relation contained in prkX × pr`X.
Then (S, (k, `)) = ∧(u,v)6∈S Ru,vk,` .
We omit the straightforward proof. Note that nothing stops us setting k = ` in the lemma, in which
case we get all binary relations (R ⊆ D2k). What does the presence of these relations in 〈Γ〉 say
about the (multi-sorted) polymorphisms for Γ? They say a lot. In fact, if Dk has size at least three,
already the not-equal relation, (x 6= y, (k, k)), alone excludes all idempotent (and so all supportive)
polymorphisms other than the dictatorships for that type:
Lemma 19 (Not-equal gadget lemma). Assume that ((x 6= y), (k, k)) ∈ 〈Γ〉. Then for every f =
(f1, · · · , ft) ∈ MPol(Γ) it must hold that fk is a dictatorship on prkX.
The above lemma together with Lemma 18 imply
Lemma 20. Assume that |prkX| ≥ 3 and the conditions of Theorem 17 hold, so we can create all Ru,vk,`
from (X, τ)+ (resp. from X, τ)f). Then the kth component of any idempotent (supportive) aggregator
f = (f1, · · · , ft) of X must be a dictatorship.
What if |prkX| = 2? Then the NAE gadget can be used to take care of the same thing.
Lemma 21 (Not-all-equal gadget lemma). Assume that the multi-sorted not-all-equal relation (|x, y, z| >
1 ∧ x, y, z ∈ prkX, (k, k, k)) gadget-reduces to a set Γ of multi-sorted relations. Then for every
f = (f1, · · · , ft) ∈ MPol(Γ) it must hold that fk is a dictatorship on prkX.
Among the conditions of Theorem 17 one explicitly states that in the case when |prkX| = 2 the
(|x, y, z| > 1 ∧ x, y, z ∈ prkX, (k, k, k)) gadget can be constructed from (X, τ)+ (resp. from X, τ)f)
to make Lemma 21 applicable.
Putting Lemmas 20 and 21 together, we conclude that if the gadgets promised by Theorem 17 are
all present, then all components of every multi-sorted polymorphism (f1, . . . , fm) are dictatorships on
the respective prjXs.
To finish the “if” part of Theorem 17 all we need to show is that these dictatorships are controlled
by the same index K (the dictator). Assume this is not the case, and let k and ` be components such
that fk is dictated by the K
th voter and f` is dictated by voter L 6= K. Because X is non-degenerate
(and so prkX and pr`X have size at least two) and because of Ko¨nig’s theorem (or simply by basic
combinatorics) there ought to be u, v ∈ prkX and u′, v′ ∈ pr`X such that
1. u 6= v and u′ 6= v′;
2. There is an element U of X that takes u on k and u′ on `;
3. There is an element V of X that takes v on k and v′ on `.
Let us now aggregate a set of votes, all from {U, V }, but the Kth vote is U and the Lth vote is V .
Then (f1, . . . , fm) aggregates this input to Z such that the k
th issue aggregates to u and the `th issue
aggregates to v′. Notice now that Ru,v
′
k,` holds for U and V , but not for Z, which is a contradiction,
since every aggregator must keep all gadgets constructible from X+ (Xf), in particular Ru,v
′
k,` . This
concludes the “if” (non-trivial) part of the proof of Theorem 17.
In the rest of the section we assume that for two types a, b ∈ [t] we have Da = Db (equivalently,
a 1-1 correspondence ‘=’ between Da, Db). We show that the ability to construct the ‘=’ gadget
between types a and b from a set Γ of (multi-sorted) relations implies that for every polymorphism
(f1, . . . , ft) of Γ we have fa = fb. This can be useful, because the algebraic theory is developed mainly
for single-sorted polymorphisms.
Lemma 22 (Equality gadget lemma). Let Γ be a set of multi-sorted relations with type set [t]. Assume
that for types a and b we have Da = Db, and that the multi-sorted equality relation (x = y, (a, b))
gadget-reduces to Γ. Then for every f = (f1, · · · , ft) ∈ MPol(Γ) it must hold that fa is identical to fb.
Proof. We need to prove that for every u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Dna (= Dnb ) it holds that fa(u) = fb(u).
Consider an arbitrary u ∈ Dna . f is a multi-sorted polymorphism of (x = y, (a, b)). This follows from
the facts that f = (f1, · · · , ft) is a polymorphism of Γ and that (x = y, (a, b)) gadget-reduces to Γ.
Therefore, since each line of the table
type a type b
u1 = u1
u2 = u2
...
un = un
fa(u) = fb(u)
above the solid horizontal line satisfies the (x = y, (a, b)) relation, we can apply polymorphism f
for the two columns of the table. Now, as discussed, f must keep the relation (x = y, (a, b)), so
fa(u) = fb(u).
7 Example: Arrow’s Theorem
Let A = {A1, . . . , Ak} denote a set of k items and let Sk be the domain that corresponds to the set of
k! different linear orders on A in a way we describe below. Each voter must vote for some linear order
and the votes have to be aggregated into a single linear order, the “choice of the society.”
Instead of thinking of a linear order as is (like A2 < A3 < A4 < A1) we rather represent it as a
sequence of
(
k
2
)
binary positions corresponding to questions of the form
A1 < A2? , A1 < A3? , . . . , An−1 < An?
(see also Section 2). When ‘<’ is a linear order on A, the answers to these questions (0 = no; 1 =
yes) uniquely (and even redundantly) encodes ‘<’ in the form of a valid evaluation. The set of all
valid evaluations (these are binary vectors of length
(
n
2
)
) is exactly the relation Sk ⊆ {0, 1}(
n
2). Arrow
famously shows:
Theorem 23 (Arrow [Arr50]). When k ≥ 3, there is no aggregator f : Snk → Sk for any n ≥ 2 that
satisfies IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship.
It is easy to see that the impossibility of S3 implies the impossibility of Sk for k ≥ 3. Below we are going
to prove Theorem 23 when k = 3, using our method of gadgets. In the A1 < A2? A2 < A3? A3 < A1?
basis (replacing ‘A1 < A3?’ with ‘A3 < A1?’ does not change the problem) we have that:
S3 = {001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110} = NAE (Not All Equal)
Since Arrow allows to aggregate different coordinates with different aggregators, we view S3 as a
multi-sorted relation with type-set [3]. We need to show that the only polymorphisms of the multi-
sorted relation set S+3 are projections (dictatorships). In section 3 we have created a gadget for
the relation (¬(x = y), (1, 3)). Let us denote it by R13. By symmetry, S+3 -gadgets also exist for
R12 = (¬(x = y), (1, 2)) and R23 = (¬(x = y), (2, 3)). Then the gadget
∃x2 : R12(x1, x2) ∧R23(x2, x3)
expresses (x1 = x3, (1, 3)) (see Fig. 2). We can similarly express any (xa = xb, (a, b)) for 1 ≤ a <
b ≤ 3. Once we have generated these relations, by Lemma 22 we conclude that every multi-sorted
polymorphism of S+3 must be a single sorted polymorphism i.e. of the form (f1, f1, f1), and it is well
known that all single-sorted idempotent polymorphisms of NAE are dictatorships.
Figure 2: The gadget expressing x1 = x3.
8 Example: Pairwise distinctness
We continue to illustrate how one can use hand-made gadgets to prove impossibility theorems for
specific domains:
Theorem 24. Let D and m such that |D| > m = 2 or |D| = m ≥ 3. Define
X = {(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Dm | x1, . . . , xm are pairwise distinct}
Then X is an impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship conditions.
In [DH10b], this theorem is proven under the IIA + Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship conditions.
A special case of this theorem, i.e. when |D| = m ≥ 3, can be derived from results in [FF11]. We
give a gadget proof for it when m = 2 and |D| = 3, which is in a sense the hardest setting of the
parameters. In this case the relation X ⊆ [3]2 is a binary relation of type (1, 2), and we have to show
that MPol(X+) contains only projections (dictatorships).
We remark that the problem in this case is essentially equivalent to showing that three coloring of
bipartite graphs is NP-hard as long as assignment giving constraints are also allowed, i.e. we are
allowed to declare that “vertex v has color c”. If we drop the bipartite condition, then the problem
is well-known to be NP hard. The bipartite condition comes from the multi-sorted nature of the
problem: relation X can connect only type 1 variables with type 2 variables.
First we create a gadget for the relation (¬(x1 = x2 = 2), (1, 1)). Clearly, by symmetry, then gadgets
also exist for any (¬(x = y = a), (b, b)), where 1 ≤ a ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ b ≤ 2.
Figure 3: The inequality gadget
The gadget that achieves this (see Fig. 3) corresponds to the following formula:
R(x1, x2) = ∃y1, . . . , y6 : X(x1, y1) ∧X(x2, y3) ∧X(y2, y1) ∧X(y4, y3) ∧X(y6, y1) ∧
∧X(y6, y3) ∧X(y6, y5) ∧ (y2 = 3) ∧ (y4 = 1) ∧ (y5 = 2)
It is not hard to check that R implements the (¬(x1 = x2 = 2), (1, 1)) relation. Let us now denote the
relation (¬(x = y = a), (b, b)) by Rba. Then Rb1(x, y) ∧ Rb2(x, y) ∧ Rb3(x, y) expresses the (x 6= y, (b, b))
relation. Finally, the gadget
T (x1, x2) = ∃y1, y2 : (x1 6= y1) ∧ (x1 6= y2) ∧ (y1 6= y2) ∧X(y1, x2) ∧X(y2, x2)
expresses (x1 = x2, (1, 2)) (see Fig. 4). Once we have generated this relation, by lemma 22 we conclude
that every multi-sorted polymorphism of X+ must be a single sorted polymorphism i.e. of the form
(f1, f1). It is well known that the only idempotent polymorphisms of the x 6= y (single-sorted) relation
are the dictatorships.
Figure 4: The equality gadget
9 Binary Evaluations
In this section we first translate the total blockades condition to the algebraic language, then using
it revisit the case of binary evaluation giving an alternative proof to the classification Theorem of E.
Dokow, R. Holzman, and also indicate the proof of Theorem 10.
9.1 Total blockedness and its consequences
Lemma 25. Let X ⊆ {0, 1}m be totally blocked (see Definition 4) and non-degenerate. Let (X, τ) be
any typing of the variables of X from a type-set [t], Da = {0, 1} for 1 ≤ a ≤ t. We also assume that
all types are used. Then for all 1 ≤ a, b ≤ t: (x = y, (a, b)) (multi-sorted) gadget-reduces to X+.
Proof. Recall that the total blockedness condition means that on the vertex set V = [m] × {0, 1}
we have a strongly connected graph defined as follows: There is a directed edge from (k, ) ∈ V to
(`, ′) ∈ V where k 6= ` if and only if there are: (i.) a subset S ⊆ [m] such that k, ` ∈ S and (ii.) a
(partial-)evaluation u : S → {0, 1} with uk =  and u` = 1− ′ such that there is no extension of u to
any full evaluation x in X, but if we flip any bit of u then the resulting partial evaluation extends to
some element of X. Let us focus on a directed edge ((k, ), (`, ′)) as above, with S = {k, `, s1, . . . , sq}
(we fix this S for k, `, , ′), and create the gadget
Ek,`,,′(xk, x`) = ∃ys1 , . . . , ysq , ~y : X(xk, x`, ys1 , . . . , ysq , ~y) ∧ (ys1 = us1) ∧ . . . ∧ (ysq = usq)
Here with some abuse of the notation we tried to indicate, via the indices, the variables’ positions in
X. In particular, ~y collects the m − 2 − q variables of X that are not in S = {k, `, s1, . . . , sq}. We
remark that the type of a variable is uniquely determined by its position in X. Then we have
Ek,`,,′(, 
′) = 1, Ek,`,,′(, 1− ′) = 0, Ek,`,,′(1− , 1− ′) = 1
All three equations follow from the fact that u : S → {0, 1} with uk =  and u` = 1 − ′ was a
minimally unsatisfying partial assignment, thus if we change the value of exactly one of the uk, u`, the
assignment becomes satisfying. Consider now a chain
((k0, 0), (k1, 1)), ((k1, 1), (k2, 2)), . . . , ((kt−1, t−1), (kt, t))
of edges in the blockedness graph, for which we have generated relations Ek0,k1,0,1 , . . . , Ekt−1,kt,t−1,t
as above. Create the gadget
R(xk0 , xkt) = ∃yk1 , . . . , ykt−1 : Ek0,k1,0,1(xk0 , yk1) ∧ . . . ∧ Ekt−1,kt,t−1,t(ykt−1 , xkt)
It is easy to see that the typing is consistent. If we set xk0 = 
0 then inductively all yki variables are
forced to take i, eventually forcing xkt = 
t. On the other hand R(1 − 0, 1 − t) = 1. To show this
it is sufficient to set all yki variables to 1 − i in the right hand side of the above formula. Since the
blockedness graph is strongly connected, for any a, b ∈ [t] with type(xk) = a, type(x`) = b for some
1 ≤ k, ` ≤ m and for any k, ` ∈ {0, 1} we can build now gadget Ra,b,,′ that forces x` = ` as long
as xk = k and also permits the xk = 1 − k, x` = 1 − ` assignment, and a gadget R′a,b,1−,1−′ that
forces x` = 1 − ` as long as xk = 1 − k and also permits the xk = k, x` = ` assignment. Then
Ra,b,,′ ∧R′a,b,1−,1−′ implements xk + k = x` + ` mod 2. In particular, by choosing k = ` = 0 we
have implemented the (x = y, (a, b)) relation.
Example 2. Let X = {000, 011, 101, 110} = {xyz ∈ {0, 1}3 | x+ y + z = 0 mod 2}. We also assume
that [t] = 3 and the ith coordinate has type i. Then the minimally infeasible partial evaluations
(MIPEs) are all those xyz ∈ {0, 1}3 for which x + y + z = 1 mod 2. Then the blockedness graph is
the directed complete graph (i.e. directed edges are drawn both ways for every edge). For k = 1, ` =
2, k = 0, ` = 1 we can create the gadget (based on S = {1, 2, 3}, u = 001):
E1,2,0,1(x1, x2) = ∃y : X(x1, x2, y) ∧ (y = 1)
This together with E1,2,1,0 created from S = {1, 2, 3}, u = 111 (accidentally, the two gadgets turn out
to be the same, so the conjunction remains E1,2,0,1(x1, x2)) gives the (x 6= y, (1, 2)) relation, as one
can check it directly.
Lemma 26. Let X ⊆ {0, 1}m, totally blocked. Then every aggregator f = (f1, . . . , fm) which is IIA
+ Idempotent satisfies that all fj’s are identical.
Proof. Let t = m and view X as the multi-sorted relation (X, (1, 2, . . . ,m)). Then (x = y, (k, `))
(1 ≤ k, ` ≤ m) gadget-reduces to X+ by Lemma 25. Since f is an idempotent IIA aggregator of X we
have that f ∈ MPol(X+). Combining the above two things the statement then follows from Lemma
22.
We remark (although do not use it in the sequel) that total blockedness also generates all non-equal
relations:
Lemma 27. Let X ⊆ {0, 1}m, totally blocked. and X has type (X, (1, . . . ,m)). Then X (as a multi-
sorted relations) generates all relations of the form (x 6= y, (a, b)), where a, b ∈ [t].
9.2 A new proof of Theorem 5
We give a new proof of the interesting part of Theorem 5 (E. Dokow, R. Holzman, [DH10a]), i.e.
that when X is totally blocked, it is a possibility domain (with respect to IIA+Idempotency+No
Dictatorship) if and only if it is an affine subspace. The new proof uses results from the algebraic
theory of constraint satisfaction problems.
Lemma 26 gives that when X is totally blocked, all idempotent multi-sorted polymorphisms of X are
single-sorted and we can use Schaefer’s theorem, or more precisely algebraic version of it (Hubie Chen
[Che09]) to determine the types of functions in Pol(X):
Theorem 28 (Schaefer, algebraic version). Let D = {0, 1} and Γ be a set (single-sorted) relations on
D. Then Γ+ either has one of the following four operations as a polymorphism:
1. The binary AND operation ∧;
2. The binary OR operation ∨;
3. The ternary majority operation Maj3(x, y, z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z);
4. The Mal’tsev operation u− v + w mod 2.
Otherwise Pol(Γ+) contains only projections (dictatorships).
Theorem 28 gives that when X is totally blocked and X is not an impossibility domain then one of
the cases 1.-4. must hold. But [DH10a] proves more, it shows that when X is totally blocked, only
Case 4. and the default case (i.e. no non-trivial polymorphisms) may occur. We provide a brief proof
of this. We exclude Cases 1.-3. as follows:
Excluding 1. and 2: We show that if ∨ ∈ Pol(X), then in the blockedness graph, no node of the form
(k, 1) has a directed edge to any node of the form (`, 0), so the blockedness graph cannot be strongly
(or anyhow) connected. For this it is sufficient to show that every MIPE has at most one variable set
to 1. Suppose that xk = x` = 1 is part of a MIPE with k 6= ` and the rest of MIPE evaluates to α.
By the definition we have assignments:
xk x` rest of MIPE rest
( 1 1 α any ) never ∈ X (since it is MIPE)
( 0 1 α some ) ∈ X (since it was MIPE)
( 1 0 α some ) ∈ X (since it was MIPE)
( 0 ∨ 1 1 ∨ 0 α some ) ∈ X (assgnm 2 ∨ assgnm 3)
Then the first and fourth lines of the table contradict to each other. An analogous proof shows that
when ∧ ∈ Pol(X) the blockedness graph is not strongly connected.
Excluding 3: Assume that X is totally blocked and Maj3 ∈ Pol(X). First we show:
Lemma 29. If Maj3 ∈ Pol(X) then every MIPE for X has length at most two.
Proof. Consider a MIPE S, which contrary to our assumption has at least three elements, x1, x2, x3.
Assume that xi evaluates to ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, while the rest of the MIPE evaluates to α. Then the
first and fifth lines of the following table together give a contradiction:
x1 x2 x3 rest of MIPE rest
( u1 u2 u3 α any ) never ∈ X (since it is MIPE)
( 1− u1 u2 u3 α some ) ∈ X (since it was MIPE)
( u1 1− u2 u3 α some ) ∈ X (since it was MIPE)
( u1 u2 1− u3 α some ) ∈ X (since it was MIPE)
( u1 u2 u3 α some ) ∈ X Maj3(assgnms 2,3,4)
Assume now that we have an edge from (k, ) to (`, ′) in the blockedness graph. Since the MIPE
creating this edge, by Lemma 29 has length two (cannot have length one), we conclude that xk = 
forces x` = 
′. Consider any x ∈ X, by our assumption the total blockedness graph is strongly
connected so there is a path from (1, x1) to (1, 1−x1), which in the light of the above argument means
that (1, x1) forces (1, 1− x1) through a sequence of edges, which is an obvious contradiction. Thus X
is empty.
Schaefer’s theorem now tells us that X must be either an impossibility domain or an affine subspace.
So what about the case when X is not totally blocked? Then we use the following deep theorem of
A. Bulatov and P. Jeavons:
Theorem 30 (Bulatov and Jeavons [BJ03]). Let D = {0, 1} and Γ be a set of multi-sorted relations
on D with type set [t]. Then for every type j ∈ [t] either for every ~f = (f1, · · · , ft) ∈ MPol(Γ+) the
jth component is a dictatorship or there is an ~f = (f1, · · · , ft) ∈ MPol(Γ+) such that fj is one of
1. the semi-lattice operation u ∨ v or u ∧ v,
2. the majority operation (u ∨ v) ∧ (v ∨ w) ∧ (w ∨ u),
3. the Mal’tsev operation u− v + w mod 2.
From this Theorem 10 easily follows.
10 Non-binary Evaluations
In this section we complete the classification theorem of Dokow and Holzman [DH10b] for non-binary
evaluations. While the two authors have only considered the supportive case, here we resolve the
idempotent case as well.
10.1 General notion of total blockedness
Dokow and Holzman [DH10b] have developed the the notion of total blockedness in the non-binary
case, i.e. for a general domain D. Our characterization theorems will use their notion.
Definition 17. Total blockedness for non-binary X is defined in [DH10b]. X is totally blocked if and
only if the following directed graph on the vertex set
V = {σσ′j | j ∈ [m] ∧ σ, σ′ ∈ prjX ∧ σ 6= σ′}
is strongly connected. There is an edge from σσ′k to ρρ
′
` where k 6= ` if and only if there are
B1 ⊆ pr1X, B2 ⊆ pr2X, . . . , Bm ⊆ prmX
such that
1. Each |Bj | = 2 (1 ≤ j ≤ m);
2. Bk = {σ, σ′} and B` = {ρ, ρ′};
3. Introduce the notation XB = X ∩
∏m
j=1Bj . Then XB is a binary relation (think of each Bi
as {0, 1}). Condition 3. is that under these definitions (k, σ) is connected with (`, ρ) in the
blockedness graph of XB (see Definition 3 for the blockedness graphs for binary domains).
10.2 Supportive non-binary evaluations
First we restate the supportive part of Theorem 8:
Theorem 31. Let X ⊆ Dm, non-degenerate and non-binary. If X is totally blocked then X is an
impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship if and only if X is an
impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship with the n ≤ 3 condition
(meaning that we find no other aggregators than dictatorships when we restrict ourselves to aggregators
with only three arguments).
Remark 3. The theorem is a classification theorem in the sense that it gives us an algorithm to
determine if a given domain X is an impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Supportiveness +
Non-dictatorship or not: just check all potential aggregators with at most three arguments.
Proof. The ‘only if’ part is straightforward since if X is an impossibility domain with respect to IIA
+ Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship then every supportive IIA aggregator f = (f1, . . . , fm) of X is
a dictatorship, not only for arity n ≤ 3. For the ‘if’ part we need the following results of E. Dokow
and R. Holzman:
Definition 18 (E. Dokow and R. Holzman [DH10b]). Let f = (f1, . . . , fm) be a supportive IIA
aggregator of arity n for X ⊆ Dm. For an issue j and an ordered pair of distinct positions u, v ∈ Dj
we translate fj |{u,v} : {u, v}n → {u, v} to a function W uvj : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} under 0↔ v, 1↔ u.
Lemma 32 (E. Dokow and R. Holzman [DH10b], Propostion 1). If X is totally blocked, then all W uvj s
are the same.
Definition 19 (E. Dokow and R. Holzman [DH10b]). We call f 2-dictatorial if all W uvj s (j ∈ [m],
u, v ∈ Dj) are dictatorships with respect to the same k.
Lemma 33 (E. Dokow and R. Holzman [DH10b], Proposition 5). If X is totally blocked and f is
2-dictatorial then f is a dictatorship.
Let us try to put the above two lemmas together! The total blockedness is a condition in the theorem
whose ‘if’ part we want to prove, so what is missing is that under the theorem’s conditions the W uvj s
are not simply the same, but they are all dictatorships. We rely on the following lemma which is
essentially a simplified version of Theorem 2.16 in [Bul11] and a multi-sorted version of Schaefer’s
dichotomy theorem (see Theorem 28 and [Che09]).
Lemma 34. Let Γ be a set of multi-sorted relations over D with type set [t]. If Γ does not have
IIA + Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship aggregators with the n ≤ 3 condition, then for any f =
(f1, · · · , ft) ∈ MPol(Γf), a ∈ [t], u, v ∈ Da with u 6= v the restriction fa|{u,v} is a dictatorship.
Proof. (of Lemma 34.) Assume the contrary, namely that Γ does not have IIA + Supportiveness +
Non-dictatorship aggregators with n ≤ 3, but it has some aggregator f = (f1, · · · , ft) ∈ MPol(Γf),
such that there exist a ∈ [t] and u, v ∈ Da, u 6= v with the property that fa|{u,v} is not a dictatorship,
where n is the arity of f . Then n must be at least 4. Let f be such a counter-example with minimal
n. In particular, any f ′ = f(x(1), . . . , x(i)︸︷︷︸
ith argument
, . . . , x(i)︸︷︷︸
i′th argument
. . . , x(n)), i.e. when we identify two
inputs, must be a two-dictatorship, because f ′ aggregates n− 1 inputs.
Denote fa|{u,v} by g, which is presumably not a dictatorship. We will arrive at a contradiction by
showing that g is a dictatorship, i.e. there exists one k ∈ [n] such that for any x1, · · · , xn ∈ D′,
g(x1, · · · , xn) = xk. Since any identification of the variables of g arises by first identifying these
variables in f , and then restricting the resulting type = a component to the binary set {u, v}, we have,
that any identification of variables of g, must result in a dictatorship. If all of these identifications
x(i) = x(i
′) result in a dictatorship that projects to coordinate i (as opposed to some coordinate
i′′ 6∈ {i, i′}), we get a contradiction by setting {i, i′} first to {1, 2} then to {3, 4}:
u = f(u, u︸︷︷︸, v, v, . . .) = f(u, u, v, v︸︷︷︸, . . .) = v. (Used that n ≥ 4.)
Thus there exist two coordinates where identifying the corresponding variables will result in a dicta-
torship function that projects to some other (i.e. not i, i′) coordinate. Wlog assume that
g(x1, x1︸ ︷︷ ︸, x3, x4, · · · , xn) = x4
Then g(x1, x1, x1, x4, · · · , xn) = x4. We show that this implies g(x1, x2, x1, x4, · · · , xn) = x4. If g|x3=x1
was a dictator xi other than x4, then setting x2 = x1 and letting x4 vary we would get a contradiction.
Similar reasoning gives that g(x1, x3, x3, x4, · · · , xn) = x4. Thus whenever there is a duplication among
the values of x1, x2, x3, the output of g is always x4. But duplication always occurs since |D′| = 2,
thus g is a dictatorship, a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the ‘if’ part of Theorem 31. Assume that when n ≤ 3 there are no other
supportive aggregators for X than dictatorships (and the other conditions: X is non-degenerate,
totally blocked) also hold. Consider an aggregator f for X with n ≥ 4. By Lemma 34, for any j ⊆ [m]
and for any u, v ∈ Dj , u 6= v, we have W uvj is a dictatorship. By Lemma 32, since X is totally blocked,
all W uvj are the same. Lemma 33 then implies that f is a dictatorship.
10.3 General idempotent non-binary evaluations
Lemma 35. For a given domain X ⊆ Dm, non-degenerate and non-binary, i.e. |D| = d ≥ 3, and
totally blocked, if X does not have any IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship aggregator with n ≤ d
condition, then X is an impossibility domain with respect to IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that X satisfies the condition of the lemma and X is a possibility
domain with respect to IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship. Then there is an idempotent IIA
aggregator f = (f1, · · · , fm) which is not a dictatorship. By the hypothesis of the lemma, f has arity
n ≥ d + 1. Assume that f is of minimal arity, i.e. no idempotent non-dictatorial aggregator with
smaller arity exists. We first show that f is supportive, i.e.
∀ x(1), · · · , x(n) ∈ X ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ m : fj(x(1)j , · · · , x(n)j ) ∈ {x(1)j , · · · , x(n)j }.
We are done if we can show that for any fixed x(1), · · · , x(n) and j we have fj(x(1)j , · · · , x(n)j ) ∈
{x(1)j , · · · , x(n)j }. We use the pigeon hole principle. Since n ≥ d + 1, among x(1)j , · · · , x(n)j there must
be at least two elements which are the same. For notational conveniences they are x
(1)
j and x
(2)
j .
Remark 4. The collision does not happen at the same pair of indices for all inputs and js, but this
does not affect us, since we are setting the input fixed.
Since the collision is at indices 1 and 2, we are going to examine the aggregator of n−1 elements g that
we get from f by identifying the first two inputs of f . Since g is also an idempotent IIA aggregator
of X, by our minimality assumption g must be a dictatorship. Thus gj is also a dictatorship and
therefore supportive. In particular,
u = gj(x
(2)
j , · · · , x(n)j ) ∈ {x(2)j , · · · , x(n)j }.
But u is also the value that fj takes on x
(1)
j , x
(2)
j · · · , x(n)j (since by our assumption x(1)j = x(2)j ). This
concludes the proof of the fact that f if supportive.
Then, since we have found a non-dictatorial supportive aggregator for X (on some number of inputs),
by Theorem 31 there must also be a non-dictatorial supportive aggregator on three inputs. Since
supportive aggregators are also idempotent we get into a contradiction with the Lemma’s assumption
that the smallest non-dictatorial idempotent aggregator is on more than |D| ≥ 3 inputs.
This lemma resolves the idempotent case, which was the remaining part of Theorem 8.
11 Algorithms to determine impossibility
When we try to determine if X ⊆ Dm is an impossibility domain or not with respect to IIA + Idempo-
tency (or Supportiveness) + Non-dictatorship, we can rely on two different types of characterization
theorems: By gadgets (Theorem 17); by aggregators (Theorem 8). Both types lead to algorithmic
solutions, and we can use both of them as alternatives.
11.1 Algorithms from the characterization by gadgets
As we have seen in the previous sections, to determine if X is an impossibility domain with respect
to IIA + Idempotency (or Supportiveness) + Non-dictatorship, we need to check if certain relations
can be expressed as X+-gadgets (Xf- gadgets). This is stated in Theorem 17. The task is therefore
to solve the following type of problem:
Find Gadget: Given a set Γ of relations over D and a relation R over D determine if there is a Γ-
gadget for R. In the multi-sorted version the relations are over a type set [t] with associated domains
D1, . . . , Dt.
At first a hurdle seems to be that the gadgets may contain arbitrary (un-specified) number of auxiliary
variables. Due to Geiger [Gei68], Jeavons [Jea98] and Trevisan et. al. [TSSW96], we however know
that the number of auxiliary variables in the smallest Γ-gadget for R is upper bounded in terms of |R|,
|D| and |Γ|. The above results easily generalize to the multi-sorted case. In our setting |Γ| is either X+
or Xf. The sizes of the latter are upper bounded in terms of m and |D|. Unfortunately, straightforward
implementations yield a double-exponential running time in |X|, D and m, and whether we can reduce
it to single exponential, we currently do not know.
In spite of their large worst case computational times, gadgets often provide very economical witnesses
to impossibility (see our two concrete earlier examples), and in all cases the witness size is at most
exponential in the above parameters.
11.2 Algorithms from the characterization by aggregators
Theorem 8 gives us a complete classification of impossibility domains for abitrary (binary or non-
binary) evaluations. Here we turn these into algorithms. We assume without loss of generality that
X is non-degenerate.
Algorithm. Determines if X ⊆ Dm is an impossibility domain under the IIA + Supportiveness +
Non-dictatorship condition:
1. Check if X is totally blocked (see Definition 17). If X is not totally blocked, then X is a
possibility domain.
Otherwise:
2. FOR each supportive f = (f1, . . . , fm) where fj : D
3
j → Dj , check if f aggregates X and it is
a Non-dictatorship. If our search returns an f satisfying the criteria, then X is a possibility
domain, otherwise it is an impossibility domain.
Note: it is enough to look only at n = 3 as opposed to n ≤ 3. The running time is dominated by step
2. The number of fs in the search is upper bounded by |D|m·|D|3 . To check for dictatorship is trivial.
To check if f is an aggregator of X takes poly(|X|,m, |D|) time. Thus we have:
Theorem 36. The complexity to determine if a given domain X ⊆ Dm is an impossibility domain
with respect to IIA + Supportiveness + Non-dictatorship is in O(poly(|X|,m, |D|)|D|m·|D|3).
Similarly (we must replace 3 with |D|) we get:
Theorem 37. The complexity to determine if a given domain X ⊆ Dm is an impossibility domain
with respect to IIA + Idempotency + Non-dictatorship is in O(poly(|X|,m, |D|) · |D|m·|D||D|).
Note that we view D as constant (binary, etc.) and consequentially view the above complexities as
single exponential.
12 Degrees of democracy
Although the Non-dictatorship condition represents minimal criterion for democracy, there are many
functions that pass the Non-dictatorship test, but can barely be called democratic. Consider for
instance the Boolean function that takes the majority value if the first voter votes zero, and takes the
value one otherwise. Although this is not dictatorship the first voter has an overwhelming way in the
outcome. What voting functions should we consider democratic? Scenarios taken from real life, such
as the American electoral system (iterated majority function), show that the majority vote is not the
only one that can be viewed as truly democratic. The answer is non-trivial.
Different criteria for democracy have been formulated such as Anonymity (invariant under Sn) or
Symmetricity, by Kalai [Kal02] (invariant under a transitive permutation group acting on [n]), that
are somewhere on the scale in between the majoritarian and dictatorial voting schemes. In this article
we would like to introduce StrongDem, with deep algebraic motivation.
StrongDem: Let f be an aggregator for X ⊆ Dm for n ≥ 2 voters that satisfies the IIA condition,
so it is of the form f = (f1, . . . , fm). We say that f is StrongDem if for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
1 ≤ i ≤ n there are c1, . . . , cn ∈ Dj such that fj(c1, . . . , ci−1, x, ci+1, . . . , cn) does not depend on
x ∈ Dj . We further require that this property holds not only for Dj but when we replace Dj
with any D′j ⊆ Dj such that the operation f preserves (respects) D′j . (In the replacement the
independence from x must hold only when x is also from D′j .)
The majority function on three or more arguments is in StrongDem: take any D′ ⊆ D and set all votes
except the vote of voter i on the jth issue to some (arbitrary) c ∈ D′. Then the outcome will be c no
matter what position the ith voter takes. Since any StrongDem aggregator is clearly Non-dictatorship,
we have the containment:
Non-dictatorship ⊃ StrongDem ⊃ Majority voting
All containments are strict in the following strong sense: For any two of the above conditions we can
find X which is a possibility domain with respect to the larger class, but an impossibility domain for
the smaller (IIA + Idempotency are assumed). An important example for an X which admits an f
with the Non-dictatorship condition, but has no StrongDem voting scheme is the affine subspace. Let
D = {0, 1}, and X = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ D3 | x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 mod 2}. There is a non-dictatorial
voting scheme when n is odd: Let fj : (u1, . . . , un)→
∑n
i=1 ui mod 2 for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. It is easy to see
that f = (f1, f2, f3) has the Non-dictatorship property. It can be shown that this is the only type of
non-dictatorial aggregator for X, and it is not StrongDem.
Majority, Anonymity, Symmetricity The scheme treats all voters exactly in the
same way
StrongDem When all others votes are appropriately fixed,
a single voter cannot change the outcome
Non-dictatorship There is not a single voter who exclusively
controls the outcome.
Figure 5: Conditions on democracy and their informal meaning
The StrongDem condition is equivalent to the aggregator falling into a well-researched class of universal
algebraic operations. This class contains operations with “no ability to count”. In contrast, functions
like the parity function that have the ability to count are very input sensitive: their value changes
even when the count changes only by one. In a far-reaching part of the algebraic theory the “no ability
to count” class of operations generate algebras that “avoid types one and two” [HM88] congruences.
This class of algebras have been recently characterized by local consistency checking algorithm, which
was a breakthrough [BK09]. What makes the notion of StrongDem particularly attractive is that
when viewing its minimalistic definition, it seems a necessary condition for democracy, but it also has
equivalent formulations, that are strong enough to accept it as a sufficient condition.
Definition 20 (Strong resilience). Let D be a finite domain and µ be a measure on D. The influence
Infi,µ(f) of the i-th variable of f : D
n → D is Probµn+1(f(x) 6= f(x′)), where x, x′ run through all
random input pairs that differ only in the i-th coordinate (µn+1 gives a natural measure on such pairs).
The maximal influence max infµ(f) is maxi Infi,µ(f). A function f : D
n → D is strongly resilient if for
every measure µ on D: max infµ(f
k)→ 0 when k →∞ where fk is defined recursively by composition
fk = f(fk−1, . . . , fk−1).
Theorem 38 (G. Kun and M. Szegedy [KS09]). The following are equivalent:
1. f is StrongDem.
2. There is a strongly resilient operation in [{f}].
13 Final notes and future research
Our translations yield further surprising findings. It turns out that Sen’s famous theorem [Sen79] has
a generalization readily taken off the shelve from [BP75, JCC98]:
Theorem 39. If X ⊆ {0, 1}m is 2-decomposable and k is odd, then the majority function with k voters
is an IIA aggregator for X. For k = odd the converse also holds.
From this Sen’s original theorem easily follows. In this work we have only started to elaborate on
the close connection between Judgment Aggregation (more generally, Evaluation Aggregation) and
universal algebra. There are several other ramifications of the connection: robustness results, extra
conditions. In a follow-up result [SX14], we deal with the majoritarian aggregators.
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